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Abstract 
The propositions of the theory of market contestability is applied to analyze if certain 
identifiable features of the rural credit markets lend support to the contestable market 
hypotheses. 
The data of the type typically available from field surveys is used to argue that 
contestability of the rural informal credit market in the Philippines, given the methodologi-
cal and data limitations, is empirically difficult to prove. The paper further argues that the 
effort to find evidence of market contestability is not necessary to argue against government 
regulation of informal financial markets. 
APPLYING CONTESTABILITY THEORY TO RURAL INFORMAL CREDIT MARKETS: 
WHAT DO WE GAIN? 
by 
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I. Introduction 
The high interest rates charged in rural informal credit markets in less developed 
economies has led to the widespread perception that these markets are monopolistic and 
that informal lenders are exploitative. This perception has in turn influenced policy making. 
The govermnent-sponsored subsidized credit programs of the seventies were due in part to 
attempts to eliminate informal lenders. Critics of these programs and the government 
regulations that result in repressed financial systems have challenged the exploitation thesis 
about informal lenders. They argue that the high interest rates on informal loans are due 
to factors other than monopoly profits, and that the participation of many lenders in the 
market is evidence of competition (Adams, Larson). Using the existence of multiple lenders 
as evidence of the lack of barriers to entry, they argue that the informal credit market is 
contestable. 
111e claim of contestability in the informal credit market is motivated in part by a 
concern to avoid unwarranted government intervention that has been demonstrated to be 
deleterious to the efficient functioning of rural financial markets. It is also a response to 
proponents of the exploitation thesis who argue that informal lenders charge monopolistic 
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rates and earn excessive profits 1• If informal markets are contestable, regulation is 
redundant because the mere existence of the threat of entry by potential competitors is 
sufficient to discourage incumbents in the market from charging interest rates in excess of 
competitive levels. 
Whether or not rural informal credit markets are contestable is debatable. Based 
on empirical tests of the perfectly contestable markets (PCM) hypothesis in concentrated 
industries, the weight of opinion in the literature seems to indicate that the theory has rather 
limited scope 2• However, the issue is not settled insofar as informal credit markets are 
concerned, and our objective here is to analyze if certain identifiable features of rural 
informal credit markets lend support to the contestable market hypothesis. The empirical 
analysis of market contestability requires a broad and intensive survey of a large number of 
homogenous lenders and borrowers. However, the data available through a standard survey 
of rural households, and the methodological problems of measuring certain variables, like 
effective interest rate and costs of lending and borrowing in an interlinked contract, restrict 
the robustness of the analysis generally conducted. In this paper we use data of the type 
typically available from field surveys to argue that contestability of the rural informal credit 
market in the Philippines is empirically difficult to prove. 
The following section briefly summarizes key propositions of the market contestabili ty 
thesis. In the third section we examine the contestable market thesis in terms of its 
1 More recent work has shown that the exploitation thesis does not depend on the 
existence of monopolistic interest rates (Basu). 
2 See Schwartz and Baumol and Willig. 
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relevance to informal credit markets, and cite some empirical data from our ongoing 
research in the Philippines. The fourth section concludes the paper. 
II. Propositions of the Perfectly Contestable Market (PCM) Theory 3 
A contestable market framework generalizes a perfectly competitive market, accom-
modates monopolistic and oligopolistic competition under specific conditions, and ensures 
a welfare optimal equilibrium under a sustainable market configuration. A perfectly 
contestable market in a static setting can be defined as one in which entry and exit have no 
barriers and are costless, and in which firms and the industry may or may not be character-
ized by economies of scale or scope (Baumol, Panzar and Willig). Production certainty, 
instantaneous adjustments and perfect information are assumed. Since the available 
production technologies and market demands are assumed to be constant, potential entrants 
are unimpeded by the prospects of post-entry price responses by incumbents but are 
impeded when existing market prices allow no profitable entry. The incumbents set product 
prices at the minimum of average costs of production, and multiproduct incumbent firms 
avoid cross subsidization to deter profitable entry by potential entrants. Therefore, since 
there is frictionless entry or exit, either the absence of sunk costs or the prevention of post-
entry responses by incumbents are sufficient for markets to be contestable. 
Appelbaum and Lim relaxed the costless and hit-and-run assumptions of the PCM 
thesis of Baumol, Panzar and Willig. They showed that in a market characterized by 
3 The key propositions of the PCM thesis are summarized here. For a fuller discussion, 
the reader may refer to a survey article on the theory of contestable markets by Spence. 
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uncertainty and efficient ex-ante production and adjustment costs, the existence of the threat 
of potential entry would induce incumbents to increase their irreversible precommitments 
and hence affect the probability of entry. Regardless of uncertainty, however, they showed 
that the existence of the threat of entry by potential entrants controls the incumbents' 
strategy. However, Schwartz and Reynolds argued that in a dynamic setting character-
ized by the presence of entry and exit frictions and the absence of instantaneous adjust-
ments, the incumbents are not disciplined by the threat of potential entry but by the actual 
entry, and hence markets become noncontestable. 
It can be seen that as a framework for analyzing industry structure, contestability 
theory focusses on variables that affect ease of entry and exit. Applied to informal credit 
markets, this approach shifts attention away from the conventional indicators of market 
power (e.g. lender concentration ratios) towards the nature of entry and exit barriers in rural 
financial markets. In the next section, we apply these PCM propositions to our survey of 
informal credit markets in the Philippines. 
III. Contestability Theory and Some Features of Rural Informal Finance 
The data used for this paper are drawn from an intensive credit market survey 
conducted in 1987-89 in six rice growing villages in the province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines. 
A total of 218 farm households and 80 landless households were randomly selected for the 
study 4• A profile of the sample households and their informal credit market transactions 
4 The focus of the survey was on the credit market transactions of the rural agricultural 
households. The survey did not collect detailed information on the operation of the informal 
lender households. 
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is presented in Tables l and 2. The research reveals that informal credit contracts are 
typified by a wide variety of credit contracts and the heterogeneity of lenders and borrowers 
5
• The informal lenders include landlords, farmers, traders, professional moneylenders, 
input dealers, millers, and retail storeowners. The high proportion of interlinked credit 
contracts, especially with farmer and trader lenders, indicates that the majority of lenders 
lend to borrowers with whom they already have existing economic dealings in related 
product or factor markets. These interlinked contracts can be treated as multiproduct 
transactions characterized by scale and scope economies as well as shared inputs in terms 
of information about the market participants. Furthermore, some degree of specialization 
by lenders towards specific classes of borrowers is observed, in which the lenders' principal 
economic activity determines their potential borrower clientele. For instance, the majority 
of trader lenders in the sample specialized in lending to farmers whose marketable surplus 
would expand the traders' market share, while farmer lenders, whose objective is to elicit 
optimal effort by their laborers, specialized in lending to landless workers. 
These empirical observations necessarily qualify the view that rural informal credit 
markets are contestable. While the PCM thesis is not explicit about the nature of the 
products being traded, the assumption of constant technology and product demand faced by 
both incumbents and potential entrants implies product homogeneity. The non-homogenous 
nature of credit distinguishes it from the exchange of other commodities in which the 
identity of the transactors does matter. The uncertainty present in any credit transaction 
5 A detailed description of the credit markets in four of the sample villages is found in 
Esguerra and Meyer. Empirical evidence reported by Floro and Geron support these 
observations. 
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leads lenders to include various explicit and implicit provisions in credit contracts as a way 
to reduce risk. The lenders also vary contract terms and conditions depending upon their 
assessment of an individual borrowers' risk characteristics. Applying the PCM argument to 
the informal credit market as a whole becomes problematic when credit contracts are highly 
differentiated and the market is segmented among lenders and borrowers. 
The presence of several lenders does not guarantee competition. Consider a trader 
lender who provides loans at ten percent monthly interest payable upon harvest with the 
requirement that the borrower sell his harvest to the lender. Suppose this lender operates 
as a monopolist in the village. By contestability, he cannot charge higher than the competi-
tive interest rate, otherwise new lenders will enter the market. But for a potential entrant 
to constrain the incumbent monopolist to the competitive interest rate, he must be able to 
enter the market and provide exactly the same type of service. In addition, the entrant must 
possess information about the creditworthiness of the monopolist's borrowers. Any potential 
entrant cannot be an effective threat to an incumbent if he does not have the same means 
to screen the incumbent's borrowers. For instance, a farmer-lender who charges a lower 
explicit interest rate and requires the borrower to work for him for a daily wage during 
seasons of peak labor demand may not affect the trader-monopolist's behavior. If the 
interlinking of credit contracts with transactions in other markets is considered as a risk 
reducing mechanism, then differences in the "ability" to engage in a particular type of 
interlinkage which depends upon a lender's other economic activities may be interpreted as 
differences in "financial technology". Moreover, if two borrowers perceive two contracts as 
7 
being distinct in the service each provides, then the lender offering the lower-explicit interest 
contract may not be able to attract another lender's borrowers. 
It is more appropriate to consider contestability of a market served by a specific type 
of lender (e.g. farmer, trader, professional moneylender). Since there are no legal restric-
tions on lender entry and exit, there is usually more than one lender per lender type 
operating in each of our study villages. But there does not appear to be an inverse relation 
between average seasonal interest rates and number of lenders in a village as reported in 
Tables 1 and 2 6• This suggests a need to further disaggregate the loan observations by 
purpose of the loan and by historical relations between the participants. It also implies that 
an informal lender offers differentiated loan contracts based on the personal and material 
attributes of borrowers. 
Even if the presence in a village of several lenders of the same type is considered as 
a measure of competition, the contestability of the informal credit markets is still unclear. 
The presence of multiple lenders only indicates that entry occurred at some time in the past, 
presumably in response to profitable opportunities. The low explicit interest rate per season 
observed among the informal lenders during the study period, compared to 60-100 percent 
seasonal explicit interest rates reported in the region in the 1960s, provides suggestive 
evidence that interest rates fell with the entry of more lenders over time (Tables 1 and 2). 
However, this evidence does not say anything about the initial lenders' pricing or interest 
rate setting behavior prior to entry, i.e. whether the threat of entry rather than entry itself 
6 A season is comprised of five to six months. The majority of the loans are contracted 
for one season. 
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caused rates to fall. PCM theory argues that potential, not actual, entry is the disciplining 
influence on incumbents' prices. 
There may exist cases where the threat of entry does not affect pricing decisions. 
Schwartz shows that an incumbent monopolist may actually set the entry-deterring price at 
the monopoly price level regardless of the ease of exit. This is possible if the monopolist 
can change his price rapidly in response to entry 7• Alternatively, an incumbent monopolist 
may choose to set his price at the monopoly level and accept entry, taking advantage of 
extra profits he may earn during an entry lag instead of choosing the entry-deterring 
competitive price. The longer the entry lag, the more profitable is this strategy. 
The second alternative seems more likely to occur in informal credit markets where 
entry, though not necessarily infeasible, may be difficult because of risk and asymmetric 
information. Furthermore, as Hayami pointed out, the importance of social relations 
defined by kinship, patronage and reciprocity as a facilitator of economic exchanges in 
agrarian settings - where markets are either missing or incomplete - may partially deter 
entry. Under these circumstances a market entrant will find that "investment" in village 
social relations is a crucial input to his lending and related activities. This is a specific type 
of investment intended to gather borrower information as well as establish the entrant's 
reputation in a particular market. As such the reputation of the entrant is a type of irrevers-
ible sunk cost. As long as village social relations are acknowledged to be crucial by informal 
7 The entrant's profit opportunity shrinks to zero as the incumbent's response time 
approaches zero. At the limit no entry occurs. 
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credit market participants, incumbents may simply take advantage of an entry lag while 
potential entrants build their capability to compete. 
IV. Conclusion 
This paper has focussed on the question of contestability as applied to rural informal 
credit markets. It has been argued that the contestable market propositions are empirically 
difficult to support using data from standard credit surveys of rural households. The 
assumption that underlie the contestability thesis - perfect information, constant financial 
technology and instantaneous adjustments in a static setting - are not easily met in practice, 
much less so in data sets drawn from segmented informal credit markets offering differenti-
ated credit contracts. The presence of many heterogenous informal lenders is not necessari-
ly evidence of competition. Even if the data are correctly interpreted as such, we cannot 
deduce contestability. Therefore, we agree with the theory's critics that contestability is 
empirically difficult to prove. 
Proving that informal credit markets are contestable is, however, not necessary in 
order to argue against government regulation of informal financial markets. The analysis 
of the contestability of rural informal credit markets requires the development of more 
robust methodological techniques, more detailed intensive surveys to unravel the complexi-
ties of informal credit contracts, followed by broader. based surveys to quantitatively test the 
nature of the relations. However, the cost of mounting an intensive data collection effort 
to find support for the contestability thesis is not justified by the gain in being able to point 
out the inability of regulating informal finance. 
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Table 1. Profile of Credit Market Transactions in the Sample Farm 
Operator Households 
Item Villages 
Vl V2 V3 V4 vs V6 
No. of households 28 31 8 24 80 47 
No. of Borrower HH 26 30 8 18 77 41 
Total no. of loan con- 123 131 29 48 291 98 
tracts 
No. of Informal loan 115 117 29 45 287 91 
contracts 
No. of IndiviS,!ual Lend~r§ 
Farmers 11 19 2 4 42 21 
Traders 5 9 1 5 10 11 
Moneylenders l 1 1 2 7 10 
Other informal • 8 10 4 2 6 5 
No. of Contracts (P~rcent interlinked contract§ to tQtal in ;uarentheses) 
Farmers 33 34 5 12 110 27 
(0) (0) (0) (0) (72) (37) 
Traders 32 67 1 12 131 26 
(50) (76) (0) (17) (91) (79) 
Moneylenders 27 2 8 11 19 18 
(52) (0) (100) (0) (63) (61) 
Other informal 23 14 15 10 27 20 
(17) (14) (33) (0) (26) (16) 
Interest rate ;u~r season (standard geviation in ;uar~ntbeses) b 
Farmers 29.6 31.2 19.7 36.6 28.7 32.7 
(14.9) (14.2) (11.6) (28.1) (11.9) (17.7) 
Traders 26.0 28.7 40.0 54.3 24.1 45.6 
(6.8) (4.9) (-) (38.1) (5.9) (27.6) 
Moneylenders 24.7 30.0 25.2 40.4 24.5 30.1 
(46.5) (-) (17.4) {10.6) (7.7) (6.5) 
Other informal 27.6 11.9 30.0 48.5 31.1 27.1 
(21.3) (56.1) (9.3) (48.5) (9.8) (14.1) 
a Other informal lenders include retail store owners, input dealers, landlords, and rice millers. 
b Excludes zero interest rate loans. 
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Table 2. Profile of Credit Market Transaclions in the Sample Landless 
Households 
Item Villages 
Vl V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
No. of households 22 20 5 4 17 12 
No. of Borrower HH 20 17 4 0 9 2 
Total no. of loan contracts 55 64 14 0 51 5 
No. of Informal loan contracts 54 64 14 0 51 5 
No. of Individual Lenders 
Farmers 9 7 4 0 11 2 
Traders 0 6 1 0 6 0 
Moneylenders 1 1 0 2 0 
Other informal • 3 7 0 0 6 2 
No. of Contracts (Percent interlinked contracts to total in parentheses) 
Farmers 41 21 10 0 17 3 
(54) (67) (80) (-) (71) (67) 
Traders 0 32 2 0 10 0 
(-) (88) (100) (-) (90) (-) 
M oncylenc.krs 4 2 2 0 3 0 
(0) (0) (100) (-) (34) (-) 
Other informal 5 9 0 0 21 2 
(0) (56) (-) (-) (67) (50) 
Interest rate per season (standard deviation in parentheses) b 
Farmers 28.6 26.4 13.9 0 24.9 7.7 
(25.5) (1.2) (24.9) (-) (8.8) (12.7) 
Traders 0 20.7 30.0 0 25.4 0 
(-) (4.0) (0) (-) (7.1) (-) 
Moneylenders 51.2 30.0 15.0 0 33.3 0 
(25.3) (0) (0) (-) (5.8) (-) 
Other informal 40.0 45.8 0 0 29.7 2.1 
(14.1) (14.0) (-) 0 (8.2) (1.1) 
a Other informal lenders include retail store owners, input dealers, landlords, and rice millers. 
b Excludes zero interest rate loans. 
